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Report prepared by Professor Nigel Lowe, Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for 
International Family Law Studies, Cardiff University Law School, Wales, UK∗ 
 
I Terms of Reference and form of report 
 
The terms of reference of this report are threefold, namely 
 
• To evaluate the existing conventions, recommendations and regulations in the field of family 
law with a view to assessing whether they correspond to society’s current needs and represent 
the standards of the Council of Europe; 
• To examine the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of family law 
with a view to identifying areas where the European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ) 
and the CJ-FA can effectively contribute to the useful/best implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and 
• To advise how the Council of Europe and in particular the CDCJ can ensure the monitoring of 
the family law legal instruments in its member states. 
 
Implicit in the first two terms of reference is the invitation to suggest the direction that the 
Council’s future work in the field of family law might or should take. 
 
With these terms of reference in mind the report comprises the following: 
 
• Introduction – which explores the key issue of what the Council’s role should be in the field of 
family law and in particular how its work relates to that of other international bodies; the 
different types and purpose of the instruments produced and the question of ratifications and 
accessions of the Council’s instruments. 
• An evaluation of the Council’s existing family law instruments; 
• How the instruments should be monitored; 
• An evaluation of the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and its possible 
impact on the Council’s future work; and finally 
• What direction the Council’s future family law programme might take. 
 
II Introduction 
 
As the Council of Europe has itself said:1 
 
“During the last thirty years there has been a period of intense legislative activity in the field of 
family law in the Council of Europe Member States.  The Council has paid special attention to 
the need for reform and has, in particular, drawn up a large number of international 
instruments (Conventions and Recommendations) on this subject”. 
 
                                                     
∗ I am indebted to Sharon Willicombe of Cardiff Law School for typing this report under considerable pressure.  I should 
also like to acknowledge the help of the Council’s Secretariat (in particular Tracey Hudson) in dealing with my many 
queries. 
1 Council of Europe Achievements in the Field of Law: Family Law and the Protection of Children DIR/JUR (2002) 9 at p 9. 
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One might add that during this period there has also been intense activity in the field of family law 
by the Hague Conference on Private International Law and, more recently, by the European 
Union. 
 
(a) The Inter-relationship between the Council’s work and that of the Hague  Conference and 
EU 
 
Apart, then, from considering the current and future relevance and utility of the Council’s 
international instruments (which will be undertaken in the next section) any review must also 
consider the Council’s output and future work as against that done by other international bodies.  
It is a key thesis of this report that clashes of international instruments must be avoided (the author 
of this report has voiced concern elsewhere about the proliferation of international instruments 
and the resulting complexity).2  It is also sensible, from a practical point of view, that the Council 
should not duplicate work done by others.  How then does the Council’s work relate to that of the 
Hague Conference and EU? 
 
(i) The Hague Conference 
 
As one might expect, given its name, the Hague Conference has traditionally been associated with 
private international law promoting internationally agreed rules of jurisdiction and consequent 
recognition and enforcement.  It does not, generally, purport to govern internal laws.3  Unlike the 
Council, membership of the Hague Conference is global (there are currently 65 member states) and 
worldwide accessions by non-member states are common (see further below).  Like the Council, 
the Hague Conference has been very active in the field of family law.  Over the last thirty years or 
so it has drawn up Conventions (the Hague Conference does not create instruments other than 
Conventions, that is, there is no Hague equivalent of the Council’s stand alone resolutions and 
recommendations)4 on the recognition of divorce and legal separation;5 the celebration and 
recognition of the validity of marriages;6 the applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
maintenance obligations;7 international child abduction;8 intercountry adoption9 and on child 
protection.10  In terms of the number of Contracting States, the Abduction Convention and 
Intercountry  Adoption Convention have been particularly successful, with 76 States ratifying or 
acceding to the former and 68 to the latter. 
 
 
(ii) The European Union 
 
                                                     
2 See e.g. N Lowe “International Conventions Affecting the Law Relating to Children – A Cause for Concern?” [2001] 
International Family Law 171 at 178-9. 
3 As an exception to this, the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children does affect domestic rules on the 
allocation of parental responsibility. 
4 Conclusions and recommendations are, however, made in the context of reviews of specific Conventions. 
5 Ie the 1970 Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorce and Legal Separation. 
6 Ie the 1973 Hague Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages. 
7 Ie the 1973 Hague Conventions on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations and on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations.  A new Convention on Child Support is currently being 
prepared. 
8 Ie the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
9 Ie the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. 
10 Ie the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect 
of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children.  This is in fact the third Convention on the 
Protection of Children: the first was drawn up in 1902 and the second in 1961. 
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A relative newcomer in the field of family law is the European Union which of course comprises 
less member states than the Council, though with the imminent succession by Bulgaria and 
Romania, there will be 27 member states.  Although the EU has long had some potential to impact 
upon family law matters, until recently it did so only peripherally.11  All that changed with the 
implementation in March 2001 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in 
Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses commonly referred to as “Brussels 
II”.12  This instrument was originally drafted as a Convention but was converted to a Regulation 
(the significance of which is that in accordance with Article 249 EC it became directly applicable in 
member states party to it)13 upon the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam which brought judicial co-
operation in civil matters squarely into the community framework.  Subsequent to Amsterdam the 
European Council set out the so-called “Tampere milestones”14 which included the notion that 
“enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgments and the necessary 
approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial 
protection of individual rights”.  In other words, the underlying rationale is that the free 
movement of judgments would facilitate the free movement of people within the Union.  The 
Council accordingly endorsed the principle of mutual recognition as the “cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation in civil… matters within the Union”.15   
 
Notwithstanding the Tampere milestones the EU does not have unlimited law making 
competence.  So far as family law is concerned competence rests upon Article 65 EC which opens 
with the words 
 
 “Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border 
implications… and insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, 
shall include…” 
 
It is generally thought16 that Art 65 limits EC competence to cross-border issues affecting the 
proper functioning of the internal market which therefore excludes matters of purely domestic 
substantive family law.  However, matters are not straightforward as (1) there is an inherent 
difficulty in drawing a firm line between a cross-border issue and one of pure domestic 
substantive law; (2) Article 308 EC provides “If action by the Community should prove necessary 
to attain… one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, and after 
consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures”.  However, notwithstanding 
the width of this provision it is unlikely to be considered to give general latitude to make 
substantive law provision, and (3) the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
Articles 7, 9 and 24 of which provide respectively for the right to respect for private and family life, 
the right to marry and found a family and for the right of the child inter alia to such protection and 
                                                     
11 See, for example, the discussion in C Hamilton and K Standly Family Law in Europe (1st edn) 580-597. 
12 Although this was first family law Regulation, it was inspired by what was then the 1968 Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, known as “Brussels I”.  That Convention 
was also converted into a Regulation (namely, Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdictions 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters), but which came into force on 1 
March 2002 ironically one year after Brussels II. 
13 That is all Member States, except Denmark 
14 Named after its meeting held in Tampere in October 1999, see Bulletin EU 10-1999. 
15 Ibid at para 1.10, 33. 
16 See e.g. M Jänterä-Jareborg “Unification of international family law in Europe – a critical perspective” Perspectives for 
the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe CEFL Series No 4 (ed K Boele-Woelki) 194. 
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care as is necessary for their well-being and to express their views freely (such views are to be 
taken into account on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity) and 
to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both parents unless it 
is contrary to their interests.  Although these rights seem to trespass upon internal substantive law, 
the Charter has not been incorporated into a Treaty and is thought to have declaratory force only.17  
Moreover, Article 51(2) EC states “The Charter does not establish any new power or task for the 
Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties”. However, 
notwithstanding this clear provision the EU Commission have already relied upon the Charter18 to 
include the child’s right of continued contact and a right to be heard in the revised Brussels II 
Regulation (discussed below).   
 
Issues of law making competence are not just important for determining what the EU can itself do, 
but also, following the so-called ERTA case law19 (by which the European Court of Justice ruled 
that each time the community exercises its international competence by adopting provisions laying 
down common rules, it acquires exclusive external competence to undertake obligations with third 
countries that affect those rules or alter their scope), limit individual member states independent 
competence to ratify or accede to rather international instruments.  This proved a thorny issue 
with regard to the European Convention on Contact Concerning Children, the opening for signing 
of which was delayed because of an argument about whether or not the Community and/or had 
competence to sign it.20 
 
At the moment there are two Regulations affecting family law, namely, Brussels I and the revised 
Brussels II21 (variously referred to as BIIR, Brussels IIA or Brussels II Bis) which from 1 March 2005 
replaced the original one.  Brussels I provides a general framework for recognition and 
enforcement of civil and commercial judgments, including maintenance, but expressly excluding 
matters of status and rights of property arising from marriage.  The revised Brussels II provides 
exclusive and separate rules of jurisdiction in relation to matrimonial proceedings (i.e. for divorce, 
annulment of marriage and separation but not directly for other issues such as for financial relief 
after divorce) and in respect of matters of parental responsibility for children and for a consequent 
scheme of recognition and enforcement.  Unlike the original Brussels II, the revised Regulation 
applies to all civil matters22 relating to the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction and 
termination of parental responsibility.  The Regulation does not, however, apply to the 
establishment or contesting of a parent-child relationship, adoption, names, emancipation, 
maintenance obligations, trusts or succession or measures taken as a result of criminal offences 
committed by children.23   
                                                     
17 See inter alia “Communication From the Commission on the Legal Nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union” Com (2000) 644 Final (11 October 2000). 
18 See the proposal dated 3.5.2002 (Com)(2002) 222 Final at p 7. 
19 See Case 22/70, Commission v Council [Re European Road Transport Agreement] [1971] ECR 263, para 17; 2/91, “ILO 
Convention No 170 Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work” [1993] ECR 1-1061, para 26; Opinion 1/94, 
“WTO” [1994] ECR 1-5267, para 77; and Opinion 2/92, “Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment” 
[1995] ECR 1-521, para 31. 
20 The power to do this is conferred by Art 22(1).  The Commission maintained that by signing up to Brussels II, Member 
States lost their competence on issues of contact.  Even now, no Member State of EU has been able to ratify this 
Convention – see further below.  It has also prevented EU wide ratification the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection 
of Children. 
21 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 OF 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. 
22 The original Regulation only applied to issues of parental responsibility for children of both spouses involved in 
matrimonial proceedings. 
23 Article 3. 
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Other Regulations are on their way.  Negotiations are at an advanced stage for what will probably 
be known as Brussels III dealing with applicable law on divorce, annulment and separation,24 and a 
Green paper on conflict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property regimes, including the 
question of jurisdiction and mutual recognition has just been published.25  Their future agenda also 
includes mediation.26 
 
(iii) The Council’s position 
 
The Council of Europe’s mandate to draw up international instruments derives from Article 1 of 
the Statute of Europe, which states  
 
 “a. The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members 
for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are 
their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. 
 
b. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council of Europe by 
discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action 
in [among other matters] legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance 
and further realisation of human rights and freedoms”. 
 
Many of the international instruments produced by the Council refer to this general mandate in 
their preamble, though they do so in different ways.  For example, the 1967 European Convention 
on the Adoption of Children refers to “the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater 
unity between its members for the purpose, among others, of facilitating their social progress”.  
The 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock” refers to the 
aim “to achieve a greater unity between its members, in particular by the adoption of common 
rules in the field of law”.  The 1997 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine refers to the aim of “the achievement of a greater unity between its 
numbers and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and 
further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.  Another variation found in 
Resolution (77)33 on the Placement of Children and Recommendation R (79) 17 Concerning the 
Protection of Children Against Ill-Treatment is to refer to the aim being “the achievement of 
greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and 
principles which are their common heritage and of facilitating their economic and social progress”.  
Other instruments simply refer to the aim “to achieve greater unity between its members”.27 
 
Although its mandate clearly extends to international regulation and control, what makes the 
Council unique in the European context (i.e. as against the Hague Conference and the European 
                                                     
24 This is currently often referred to as Rome III. 
25 Com (2006) 400 final. 
26 See Proposed Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and 
Commercial Matters Com (2004) 718 final (22 October 2004). 
27 See the 1996 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights and the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality. 
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Union) is its mandate to harmonise domestic laws.  Indeed, as one former Head of the Private and 
International Law Division, Directorate of Legal Affairs at the Council has put it,28  
 
“By promoting law reform, harmonisation and co-operation, the Council of Europe  
assists domestic laws to cope with the problems of both national and international 
families”. 
 
It is suggested that this norm setting approach, driven in part by rulings of the European Court of 
Human Rights (it is of course vital that the Council’s work is informed by that Court’s decisions)29 
is not only what the Council does best but also will generally avoid clashes with Hague or EU 
instruments.  It is proposed, therefore, to add this criterion to that of modernity and utility when 
assessing existing instruments.  It will also be an important consideration when planning future 
work.  This theme will therefore be developed throughout this paper but at this stage it may 
simply be observed that the current work on adoption and on the establishment and legal 
consequences of parentage fall classically within the criteria.  On the other hand, the 1980 Custody 
Convention strayed into the territory of private international law and though, ironically, attracting 
more Contracting States than other instruments, it was from the outset generally treated as of 
secondary importance to the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention and has now been virtually 
superseded by the revised Brussels II Regulation (see further below). 
 
(b) The types of instruments produced by the Council 
 
One of the curious features of the Council’s work is the different types of international instruments 
produced, namely, Conventions, Recommendations and now, “White Papers”.  Conventions are 
familiar international instruments and require no further discussion.  Recommendations, however, 
are unusual.  Although often produced as the result of lengthy consultation and no less conditional 
on member states’ general agreement, recommendations clearly have less standing than 
Conventions.  They are not formally signed or ratified by member states and although there is 
power to monitor their implementation (Article 15 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 
empowers the Committee of Ministers to “request governments of members to inform it of the 
action taken by them with regard to… recommendations”) there are no sanctions against “non 
compliance”.  They have aptly been described by one commentary30 as “guidelines” and by 
another31 as “international aspirations”. 
 
What then is their utility?  First, they have been and can be used as a prompt to member states to 
implement existing Conventions.  Secondly, they can be used as the basis for future Conventions 
and thirdly, they have the advantage of providing international encouragement to member states 
to ensure that their national laws comply with recommendations but at the same time giving 
leeway as to how and when.  They can also be used by the European Court of Human Rights when 
determining the extent to which a particular legal solution has been commonly embraced. 
 
                                                     
28 Margaret Killerby “The Council of Europe’s Contribution to Family Law (Past, Present and Future)” in Families Across 
Frontiers (eds N Lowe and G Douglas) 13 at 25. 
29 Indeed, as para 1 of the Warsaw Declaration Third Summit of the Heads of State and Government of Member States of 
the Council of Europe, Warsaw, May 2005 (CM/2005 145 rev) states “The Council of Europe shall pursue its core 
objective of preserving and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law.  All activities must contribute to 
this fundamental objective”. 
30 Killerby, op cit, at 14. 
31 Lowe and Douglas Bromley’s Family Law (10th edn) 27. 
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There seems, however, to be no Council policy on the use of recommendations, and this seems 
worthy of review (see further below).  One issue might be whether the Council should be able to 
withdraw or modify a recommendation. 
 
For the sake of completeness mention needs to be made of the “White Paper” on “Principles 
Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of Parentage”.  This is clearly a 
consultation paper but is something of a departure in the field of family law instruments.  It raises 
the issue as to whether such White Papers should become common or at least more common 
practice. 
 
(c) Ratification and accession issues 
 
It is a matter of concern that there have been relatively few ratifications particularly of the later 
family law conventions.  It is especially disappointing that there have only been 10 ratifications 
with a further 14 signatures of the 1996 Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights and only 3 
ratifications with a further 14 signatures of the 2003 Convention on Contact Concerning Children.  
In the latter case matters have undoubtedly been complicated by the question of the individual 
competence of member states of the European Union to ratify and it may be that that has now 
become an issue with regard to the 1996 Convention.  What this points to, however, is the need to 
consider these issues at the earliest point possible when preparing new Conventions, though of 
course making provision for the European Community to ratify, as in the case of the Contact 
Convention, might go some way to solving any problems. 
 
It seems a good policy to facilitate as wide a commitment to the Council’s Conventions as possible.  
Observer status at the drafting stage ought therefore to be encouraged as should accessions.  In 
this respect it is notable that the 2001 European Convention on Cybercrime has been acceded to by 
the USA and signed by Canada, Japan, Montenegro and South Africa.  This provides a useful 
precedent for any future family law instruments.  Furthermore, in another welcome development 
of direct relevance to the family law field, it is to be noted that Canada, Mexico, Japan and the USA 
together with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the European 
Community were invited as observers to the first meeting of the Standing Committee on the 1996 
European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights held in June 2006.32 
 
So far as accessions are concerned attention needs to be paid to the precise mechanisms.  The 1967 
Adoption Convention and the 1975 Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of 
Wedlock simply stated that after entry into force the Committee of Ministers “may invite any non-
member State to accede…”.  On the other hand, while accessions to the 1980 Custody Convention, 
are at the invitation of the Committee of Ministers they are made subject to a “unanimous vote of 
the representatives of the Contracting States entitled to sit on the Committee”.  A similar wording 
can be found in the 2003 Convention on Contact Concerning Children and is proposed for the 
revised Convention on Adoption.  A different and more elaborate provision is made in the 1996 
Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights inasmuch as the Committee of Ministers, either on 
its own initiative or following a proposal from the Standing Committee to that Convention and 
after consultation with the parties, can invite accessions by non-member states as well as the 
European Community, but it is still subject to a unanimous vote of the representatives of the 
Contracting States entitled to sit on the Committee of Ministers. 
 
                                                     
32 T-ED 3 (2006) E. 
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All these provisions give the impression that accessions are unusual and, particularly, given the 
right of veto of existing Contracting States in many of the Conventions, are difficult.   It might be 
more “accession” friendly if, in future Conventions, provision is made for an applicant State itself 
to apply to accede which is simply made subject to the approval of the Committee of Ministers 
after consultation with existing Contracting States. 
 
III An Evaluation of the Existing Instruments 
 
(a) European Convention on the Adoption of Children 1967 and the draft European 
Convention on Adoption of Children (Revised) 
 
The 1967 Adoption Convention was the first Convention in the field of family law drawn up by the 
Council.  Its aim was to update and harmonise the laws of member states and thus to avoid 
conflict of laws where the adoption involves a child’s transfer from one State to another.  The 
Convention deals with the conditions for adoption and the type of adoption and contains 
provisions concerning such consequential issues as name, nationality and succession. It quickly 
attracted 19 ratifications and three signatures though it has since been denounced by Sweden and 
partially denounced by the United Kingdom (the only instance of a denunciation of a Council 
instrument in the field of family law).  It is also potentially the first family law Convention to be 
completely revised.33  Such a revision is timely.   
 
Although it is perhaps outside the terms of reference of this report to comment on the specific 
provisions of the draft, it may be observed that (i) requiring the consent of the child (Art 4(1)(b)) is 
likely to be controversial.  Such a recommendation was, for example, specifically not enacted in the 
recently implemented Adoption and Children Act 2002 in England and Wales in part because of 
the fact that it would place an unnecessary burden on the child.  Would it not be preferable just to 
make provision for consultation as in Article 5(2)?; 
(ii) Although the proposed Article 6(2), under which re-adoptions are restricted to certain limited 
circumstances, repeats Article 6(2) of the 1967 Convention it may be wondered whether it is too 
rigid.  In particular it is not clear whether it permits a re-adoption following the breakdown as 
opposed to the “ending” of the first (query whether Article 6(2)(d) could be interpreted as 
accommodating this scenario?). 
 
One further point needs to be made, namely, the absence of any reviewing mechanism which 
needs to be addressed before finalising the instrument (see further below). 
 
But these comments apart, the revised Adoption Convention satisfies the requirements of 
modernity and utility and happily sits with the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention.  It 
will therefore be a useful additional Convention in the field of family law. 
 
(b) The 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock, 
Recommendation No R (84)4 on parental responsibilities and the “White Paper On 
Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of Parentage” 
 
The 1975 Convention, which has been ratified by 21 States and signed by a further 4, seeks to 
assimilate the status of children born out of wedlock with that of children born in wedlock.  
                                                     
33 Although the 2003 Convention on Contact Concerning Children amends and replaces Article 11(2) and (3) of the 1980 
Custody Convention, see below. 
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Though important at the time of its conclusion, it has long been recognised that this Convention 
needs updating and indeed at its 30th meeting in September 1997 the CJ-FA gave Working Party 
No 2 on the legal status of children the task of drawing up a report containing principles relating 
to the establishment and legal consequences of parentage.  In 1998 the Working Party was 
mandated to prepare principles to be included in an international instrument (either a Convention 
or a Recommendation) on the legal status of children in the light of the proposals made during the 
XXVIIth Colloquy on European Law on legal problems relating to parentage (Malta, 1997).  In the 
event the Working Party produced a “White Paper” On Principles Concerning the Establishment and 
Legal Consequences of Parentage, which was adopted by the CJ-FA in 2001, and published for 
consultation.34  The CJ-FA was mandated to produce a report taking into account comments made 
on the White Paper.  At the time of writing, however, it has not yet done so.   
 
Before examining the White Paper in more detail reference also needs to be made to 
Recommendation No R(84) 4 on Parental Responsibilities.  That Recommendation comprises 11 
Principles concerning the attribution and exercise of parental responsibilities (though it may be 
noted that the difference between attribution and exercise is not clearly delineated by the 
Recommendation).35  Although largely complimentary to the 1975 Convention, there is some direct 
overlap in the Recommendation, for example, the duty of all parents to maintain the child (Article 
6 of the Convention and Principle 8 of the Recommendation) and the possibility of the parent with 
whom the child does not live to maintain a personal relationship with the child (Article 8 and 
Principle 8).  On other occasions the relationship between the provisions requires careful analysis.  
Thus, for example, while Article 7 provides that “where the affiliation of a child born out of 
wedlock has been established as regards both parents, parental authority may not be attributed 
automatically to the father alone”; Principle 7(2) allows in these circumstances for parental 
responsibilities to be exercised by the father alone.  The two provisions are compatible since the 
former is dealing with the attribution and the latter with the exercise of parental 
authority/responsibilities.  In short, however, the relationship between the two instruments is 
problematic and any revision of the 1975 Convention should also take on board Recommendation 
(84) 4 so as to avoid both the inconvenience of having two instruments and the possibility of any 
perceived clash or inconsistency between them. 
 
The White Paper comprises three parts; Part A: principles relating to the establishment of legal 
parentage; Part B: principles relating to legal consequences of parentage; and Part C: possible legal 
consequences where the parentage has not been established.  Parts A and B are substantial 
containing 17 and 11 Principles respectively (Part C comprises just one Principle) and would 
largely update and replace the 1975 Convention as well as covering other areas.  The replacement 
provisions are not in the same order as the 1975 Convention, for example, while Principles 1 and 2 
roughly equate to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention (establishment of maternal and paternal 
affiliation respectively), Article 6 would be replaced by Principle 26 in the White Paper (parental 
obligation to maintain), and Article 7 by a combination of Principles 19 and 20 (in whom parental 
responsibilities are vested and by whom exercisable).  It would be helpful if the derivations are 
spelt out in the Explanatory Report. 
 
Not all the provisions of the 1975 Convention are covered by the White Paper’s Principles.  One of 
these, Article 9 which deals with succession (a child born out of wedlock should have the same 
                                                     
34 CF-FA (2001) 16 rev. 
35 Ie there are no discrete parts of the Recommendation focused respectively on attribution and exercise.  Indeed, some 
Principles e.g. Principle 7 deal with both. 
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rights of succession as a child born in wedlock) is, however, expressly discussed at pars 85 and 86 
of the White Paper.  But nothing is said about Article 10 under which a parents’ subsequent 
marriage confers the legal status of a child born in wedlock.  It may be, of course, that this 
provision is considered now to be outdated and unnecessary, but the White Paper’s silence is not 
helpful.  Another Article, Article 8 which deals with access, is also not dealt with in the White 
Paper though this is covered by the Convention on Contact Concerning Children, but again some 
express reference in the Explanatory Notes would be helpful. 
 
The White Paper’s Principles also generally updates and replaces those in Recommendation 84 (4) 
though again not in the same order.  Thus Principle 18 of the White Paper (defining parental 
responsibilities) is the equivalent to Principle 1 of the Recommendation; Principle 19(1) (attribution 
of parental responsibilities) is equivalent of Principle 5 of the Recommendation; Principle 20 
(insofar as it deals with the exercise rather than the attribution of parental responsibilities) is the 
equivalent of Principle 2; Principle 21 (right of child to express views etc) is the equivalent of 
Principle 3; Principle 22 (effect of divorce etc) is the equivalent of Principle 6; Principle 23 (effect of 
death) is the equivalent of Principle 9; Principles 24 and 25 (deprivation of parental 
responsibilities) cover Principle 4 and Principle 26 (obligation to maintain) is the equivalent of 
Principle 8 of the Recommendation.  There is, however, no systematic reference to the 
Recommendation in the White Paper and it is suggested that there should be.  Moreover, not all 
the Recommendation’s Principles are accommodated by the White Paper.  In particular, there is no 
equivalent of Principle 10 (joint exercise of responsibilities by agreement), nor of Principle 11 (the 
right to be informed of the exercise of responsibilities).  It is suggested that these gaps need to be 
addressed. 
 
Although the White Paper’s Principles provide a rational scheme it is not above criticism.  First, it 
does not clearly differentiate between the attribution and exercise of parental responsibilities nor 
with whether legal parenthood should be distinct from parents having parental responsibilities.  
Secondly, it is perhaps odd (certainly as a matter of structure) to deal with maintenance (Principle 
26), name (Principle 27) and nationality (Principle 28) after dealing with parental responsibilities.  
There is also a gap in that nothing is mentioned of citizenship.  Thirdly, Principles 15 and 16 (on 
adoption) are surely too extensive and in any event overlap with the draft Adoption Convention.  
Fourthly, there are the already identified gaps of coverage of the 1975 Convention and the 1984 
Recommendations. Regard also needs to be had to recent rulings by the European Court of Human 
Rights36 that limits on the ability to initiate paternity proceedings need to be proportionate and non 
discriminatory. In addition, the “Principles Regarding Parental Responsibilities” recently drafted 
by the academic body, the Commission on European Family Law (CEFL), could also profitably be 
consulted and even accommodated.  To accommodate some of these criticisms, consideration 
could be given to having a section on the consequences of parentage for the child. 
 
Notwithstanding the above comments, it is suggested that a new instrument (in the author’s firm 
view, it should be a Convention) on Parentage is essential.  Such an instrument should clearly 
replace the 1975 Convention and 1984 Recommendations.  The new instrument would satisfy the 
                                                     
36 E.g.Paulik v Slovakia (Application No 10699/05), [2006] 3 FCR 323, Tavli v Turkey (Application No 11449/02), Rozanski v 
Poland (Application No 55339/00), [2006] 2 FCR 178, Mizzi v Malta (Application No 26111/01), [2006] 1 FLR 1048 and 
Shofman v Russia (Application No 74826/01) [2006] 1 FLR 680.  Note also Mikulic v Croatia [2002] 1 FCR 720 in which a 
court’s inefficiency in determining paternity was held to be in breach of the child’s Article 8 rights to have her personal 
identity resolved without unnecessary delay; and Karcheva and another v Bulgaria (Application No 60939/00), [2006] 3 FCR 
434 in which the undue length (over 6 years) of proceedings to resolve paternity was held to violate Article 6. 
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criteria of modernity and utility and would not clash with any other existing international 
instruments.  It is suggested that work on this should be regarded as a top priority. 
 
(c) The 1980 European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning 
Custody of Children and a Restoration of Custody of Children 
 
The 1980 Convention is the most widely accepted of all the European Conventions in the field of 
family law, having been ratified by 34 States, acceded to by one and signed by a further State.  It 
has been augmented by two Recommendations, namely Recommendation No R (95)6 and 
Recommendation R(99)7.  Both urged those States that had not already done so, to sign and ratify 
both the European Convention and the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention.  The 1995 
Recommendation also sought to encourage States to improve the operation of transfrontier access 
to children and, mindful of the delay of repatriation of a child where neither parent is able or 
willing to pay for its costs, urged States “to secure the rapid return of a child in compliance with a 
court decision”.  The 1999 Recommendation urged Contracting States to withdraw reservations 
and “whenever possible” to make a decision concerning recognition and enforcement within six 
weeks from the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial authority. 
 
Although commonly perceived as an instrument for dealing primarily with child abduction, or 
what the Convention itself refers to as “improper removals”, the Convention has a wider ambit, 
namely, as its title indicates, the recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to the custody 
of and access to children under the age of 16.  At the time of its original conception,37 there was a 
desperate need for some form of international regulation in this area and there were no competing 
instruments or even proposals.38 However, notwithstanding the innovation both of extending the 
technique of recognition and enforcement to custody orders (which had hitherto been ignored by 
other instruments) and of creating a Central Authority to administer the day-to-day working of the 
Convention, the instrument was quickly overshadowed by the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention 
which came into force just three months after the European Convention. 
 
The European Convention has generally been perceived as being more complex than the Hague39 
and though States found it convenient to ratify both instruments, it was evident that the European 
Convention was invoked only in a minority of abduction cases.40  There is, however, one area 
where the European Convention is superior to that of the Hague, namely, in relation to access 
since unlike under the latter instrument, under the former there is a clear Convention obligation 
upon the courts to recognise and enforce such orders.41  But even this advantage has now been all 
but negated by the revised Brussels II Regulation which came fully into force on 1 March 2005 and 
                                                     
37 Viz the Seventh Conference of European Ministers held at Basle in 1972 which was concerned with ways of improving 
co-operation in respect of guardianship and custody of children, based on a report presented by the then Austrian 
Minister of Justice, Christian Boda, see the Council’s Explanatory Report to the Convention and R L Jones “Council of 
Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to the Custody of Children” (1981) 30 ICLQ 
467. 
38 The Hague’s work on child abduction did not begin until 1976, see Lowe, Everall and Nicholls International Movement 
of Children, Law Practice and Procedure at 12.1. 
39 See C Bruch “How to Draft a Successful Family Law Convention: Lessons from the Child Abduction Convention” in 
Doek, Van Loon and Vlaardingerbroek (eds) Children on the Move 47 at 54. 
40 Ie in less than 10% of cases, see N Lowe and A Perry “International Child Abduction – The English Experience” (1999) 
48 ICLQ 127. 
41 Indeed, in Re G (A Minor)(Enforcement of Access Abroad) [1993] Fam 216 Hoffmann LJ expressly advised English 
practitioners to use the European Convention in preference to the Hague. 
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which takes precedence over both the European and Hague Conventions.42  It is now the case that 
as between member states of the European Union (except Denmark) recognition and enforcement 
both of custody or access orders is exclusively governed by the revised Brussels II Regulation.  This 
in turn means that the European Convention can only be invoked by or “against” Contracting 
States that are not party to Brussels II, namely (at the time of this report) Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Montenegro.  With their accession to the European Union in 
2007, Bulgaria and Romania will become parties to Brussels II.  Even in these cases, with the 
exception of Liechtenstein, which alone of the Contracting States to the European Convention, is 
not a Contracting State to the Hague Convention, the probability is that in the vast majority of 
cases it will be the Hague Convention that is invoked and not the European.  Even the advantage 
of using the European Convention in relation to access will diminish if States choose to ratify the 
1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and the Council’s own 2003 Convention on 
Contact Concerning Children since both also deal with that area. 
 
What conclusions should be drawn from these developments?  There are two.  First, there seems 
no point in actively promoting the Convention.  It has essentially served its purpose though, 
equally, if States choose to preserve it (and no State has yet denounced it) there is no need, even if 
it were possible, to revoke the Convention altogether, for example, by encouraging denunciations.  
The second point is that the history of the Convention illustrates the dangers and complexities of 
dealing with private international law issues.  This is not to say that the Council should never 
venture into this arena but that it should at least be alive to the potential problems of doing so. 
 
(d) The 1996 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights 
 
The 1996 Convention, which has been ratified by 10 States and signed by a further 14, is essentially 
designed to underpin the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child (particularly 
Article 12(2)) by providing for the procedural rights of children to be heard in legal proceedings. 
 
In 1990 the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a Recommendation on the rights of children43 which 
included an invitation to the Committee of Ministers to take steps to examine the possibility of 
drawing up a legal instrument to secure among other things the rights of children in court 
proceedings.  Following this invitation the Committee of Experts on Family Law were given the 
task of preparing an appropriate instrument on certain questions relating to the rights of children 
not already covered by the UN Conventions.  That Committee decided44 to prepare an instrument 
“which would facilitate the exercise of children’s rights by strengthening their procedural rights” 
so as to ensure, in the words of Article 1(2), that “children are, themselves or through other 
persons or bodies, informed and allowed to participate in proceedings affecting them before a 
judicial authority”. 
 
Article 1(3) confines the Convention’s application to “family proceedings, in particular those 
involving the exercise of parental responsibilities such as residence and access to children”, while 
Article 1(4) requires Contracting States to “specify at least three categories of family cases before a 
judicial authority to which this Convention shall apply”.  Curiously, “family cases” are not defined 
in the Convention but according to the Explanatory Report45 examples of categories which may be 
                                                     
42 See respectively Article 60(d) and (e) of the revised Regulation. 
43 Recommendation 1121 (1990). 
44 See Margaret Killerby “The Council of Europe’s Contribution to Family Law”, op cit n 26, at 25. 
45 Published by the Council of Europe, 1997, see para 17. 
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specified are custody, residence, access, questions of parentage, legitimacy (declaration, 
contestation), adoption, legal guardianship; administration of property of children; care 
procedures; removal or restriction of parental responsibilities; protection from cruel and degrading 
treatment and medical treatment.  
 
Whether Article 1(4) is wise can be debated for what it means is that even among Contracting 
States there may be no uniformity on which areas are covered by the Convention.  Furthermore, it 
allows States to nominate relatively narrow areas.  Another difficulty is that the Explanatory 
Report is loosely worded and could be interpreted as permitting States to nominate their own 
categories of cases. 
 
The substantive part of the Convention makes important provision for 
 
• children’s procedural rights – in particular the right, if considered by internal law as having 
sufficient understanding, to be informed and express views in proceedings (Article 3) and 
the right to apply for the appointment of a special representative (Article 4); 
• the role of judicial authorities – in particular the duty to consider whether it has sufficient 
information at its disposal to take a decision in the best interests of the child and, if not, to 
obtain further information; to ensure that children having sufficient understanding have 
received all relevant information; to consult the child in appropriate cases; to allow the 
child to express his or her views and to give due weight to those views (Article 6); to act 
speedily (Article 7); and to appoint a special representative for the child in cases where 
holders of parental responsibilities are precluded from representing the child as a result of 
a conflict of interests between them and the child (Article 9); 
• the role of representatives – in particular to provide to a child having sufficient 
understanding, relevant information and explanations of the possible consequences of 
compliance with his or her views and to determine those views and present them to court 
(Article 10). 
 
In addition, Article 13 encourages States to make provision for mediation and other processes to 
resolve disputes so as to avoid proceedings being taken before a judicial authority.   
 
One further innovation of the Convention is the creation of a Standing Committee to keep the 
Convention under review and to make any recommendations or propose amendments (Article 
16).46 
 
It was anticipated that the 1996 Convention would attract widespread ratification47 but the 
response has (so far) been more muted (see above).  One suspects that one of the reasons that 
States have not ratified the Convention is the reluctance to commit themselves to the costs of 
compliance even in three nominated areas of family cases.  Ironically, a lot of the criticism of the 
Convention is that it does not go far enough; in particular it is complained that it “back-pedals” on 
the aims of Article 12 of the UN Convention by only applying children considered by internal law as 
                                                     
46 According to Article 18, the Standing Committee should have been invited to meet within three years of the 
Convention coming into force.  In fact it did not meet until June 2006 (see Standing Committee on the European 
Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (T-ED), T-ED 3 (2006) E, nearly six years after the Convention came into 
force.  See further below. 
47 See Killerby, op cit n 26, at 25. 
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having sufficient understanding which according to one commentator48 “enables a state to adopt 
an arbitrary and extremely high qualifying age before children can be deemed of “sufficient 
understanding”, irrespective of the actual competence of children below it”.  Others49 complain 
that it is “weak” and “toothless” especially when compared with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms the Convention does serve a useful purpose.  The Committee of 
Experts on Family Law were obviously right to identify that a weakness of the UN Convention is 
that children may not be able to exercise their substantive rights and appropriate procedural 
measures to back them up.  The 1996 Convention goes some way to address that weakness albeit 
in a limited way.  The criticism that the Convention does not go far enough is not entirely well 
made since (a) it is not in derogation of the UN Convention so that Article 12 of that Convention 
still imposes a wider international obligation on State parties to that Convention50 and (b) the 
assertion that States could fix an arbitrarily high qualifying age of competence, overlooks the 
impact of the European Convention on Human Rights and the potential scrutiny of the European 
Court at Strasbourg.  That court is unlikely to accept that arbitrary assessments of competence will 
satisfy the requirements of a fair trial under Article 6 or justify interference with family life under 
Article 8. 
 
The lack of “teeth” for enforcing the Convention is a more telling criticism, though whether the 
creation of a more effective monitoring system would encourage more ratifications is perhaps 
debatable.  Certainly, the Standing Committee does not operate as a scrutiny committee to ensure 
individual State compliance.  Perhaps consideration could be given to “beefing up” the Standing 
Committee’s role in this regard.   
 
For all its imperfections, the 1996 Convention is worth pursuing.  It is the only international 
instrument that attempts to spell out the obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.  It deals with a key area of importance and one which is likely to become more rather than 
less important as legal systems are increasingly moving away from treating children as passive 
victims of family breakdown towards regarding them as participants and actors in their family 
justice system.  It is therefore recommended that renewed effort be made to encourage States to 
ratify the Convention or at least to provide some explanation as to why they are not prepared to 
do so. 
 
(e) The 2003 European Convention on Contact Concerning Children 
 
The European Convention on Contact Concerning Children was finally opened for signature on 3 
May 200351 and has now been ratified by 3 States and signed by 14 others.  One stumbling block for 
ratifications is the competence of individual member states of the European Union to be able to do 
so (discussed above). 
 
                                                     
48 J Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (2nd edn) 201.  See also, for a comprehensive critique, C. Sawyer “One 
step forward, two steps back – the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights” [1999] 11 CFLQ 151. 
49 M Freeman The Moral Status of Children 39. 
50 Which can therefore be subject to adverse comments by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child which 
scrutinises the UN Convention. 
51 It had been planned to open the Convention for signature during the 6th European Conference on Family Law in 
October 2002 but this was delayed to resolve a dispute over EU Member States’ competence to sign and ratify it. 
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The Convention has its origins in a recommendation of the Third European Conference on Family 
Law, “Family Law in the future”52 which noted “that with the continuing internationalisation of 
family relationships within a unified Europe, the question of transfrontier access was becoming 
more and more topical”.53  Work began in 1996 when the CJ-FA set up a Working Party on custody 
and access. 
 
(i) The scope and scheme of the Convention 
 
Article 1 sets out three objects of the Convention, namely: 
 
‘(a)    to determine general principles to be applied to contact orders; 
 
(b)   to fix appropriate safeguards and guarantees to ensure the proper exercise of contact and 
the immediate return of children at the end of the period of contact; 
 
(c) to establish co-operation between central authorities, judicial authorities and other bodies 
in order to promote and improve contact between children and their parents, and other 
persons having family ties with children’. 
 
Although the second object is primarily and the third object is exclusively concerned with trans-
frontier contact, the first object is concerned to establish general principles which domestic courts 
should observe when dealing with contact issues.  The thinking behind this is explained in the 
Preamble, namely that the ‘machinery set up to give effect to foreign orders relating to contact 
concerning children is more likely to provide satisfactory results where the principles on which 
these foreign orders are based are similar to the principles in the State giving effect to such foreign 
orders’. 
 
The Convention’s reference to ‘contact’ rather than ‘access’ is a deliberate change of terminology 
and is intended to be ‘more in line with the modern concerns such as a parental responsibility or 
parental responsibilities’.54  
 
Contact itself is widely defined by Article 2 to include staying contact for a limited time, other 
forms of communication and the provision of information both to and about the child.55  A ‘contact 
order’ is defined as a decision of a judicial authority (which means both a court and an 
administrative authority having equivalent powers) in respect of any level of contact.  An order 
also includes ‘an agreement concerning contact which has been confirmed by a competent judicial 
authority or which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument and is 
enforceable’.  The Explanatory Report explains that ‘The inclusion of both court-approved 
agreements and authentic instruments … is due to the fact that in very many cases, contact with a 
child results from private agreements rather than a judicial decision’.  However, these must be 
distinguished from purely private agreements which are outside the scope of the Convention. 
 
                                                     
52 Cadiz, Spain, April 1995. 
53 See the Explanatory Report to the Convention at para 1. 
54 Explanatory Report, para 6. 
55 Ie children under the age of 18 ‘in respect of which a contact order may be made or enforced in a State Party’ (Article 
2(c)).  This latter qualification preserves, as does the revised Brussels II Regulation, the application of those internal laws 
where a child under the age of 18 can obtain full capacity (for example, upon marriage) or whose orders cannot be made 
or enforced where the child is 16 or over as, for example, in Scotland. 
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Recognition and enforcement of trans-frontier contact orders 
 
Although the  Convention neither establishes rules of jurisdiction nor deals directly with issues of 
recognition and enforcement, provision was nevertheless thought to be needed to underline ‘the 
obligation of States Parties to establish, where applicable, in accordance with relevant international 
instruments, means to facilitate the exercise of contact and custody rights in the case of 
transfrontier contact order’.56  Article 14 accordingly states that States Parties must provide   
 
‘(a) a system for recognition and operation of law and, where appropriate, enforcement of 
orders made in other Contracting States concerning contact and rights of custody; and 
 
(b) a procedure for the advance recognition and enforcement of contact orders made in other 
States’. 
 
Advance recognition and enforcement is both important and innovative.  As the Explanatory 
Report says,57 such a provision ‘is the most important guarantee to be taken in order to facilitate 
the normal exercise of the right of transfrontier contact’.  Its main advantage is that ‘the prompt 
return of the child after a period of contact would be facilitated in case of any removal or retention 
of the child and therefore the parent not having custody of the child would be less likely to try to 
retain the child after a period of contact’. 
 
Under Article 15 the judicial authority of the State Party in which a transfrontier contact order in 
another State party is to be implemented may, when recognising or declaring enforceable such a 
contact order, or at any later time: 
 
‘fix or adapt the conditions for its implementation, as well as any safeguards or guarantees 
attaching to it, if necessary for facilitating the exercise of this contact, provided that the 
essential elements of the order are respected and taking into account, in particular, a 
change of circumstances and the arrangements made by the persons concerned.  In no 
circumstances may the foreign decision be reviewed as to its substance’. 
 
Article 15 is modelled on Article 11(2) of the 1980 European Custody Convention, which provision 
replaces.58  It is intended that the new wording will remove the current problems of interpreting 
the existing provision.59   
 
Article 16 deals with the crucial issue of the child’s return at the end of a period of transfrontier 
contact.  It provides: 
 
‘1. Where a child at the end of a period of transfrontier contact based on a contact order 
is not returned, the competent authorities shall, upon request, ensure the child’s 
immediate return, where applicable, by applying the relevant provisions of 
                                                     
56 Explanatory Report, para 108. 
57 At para 111. 
58 See Art 19, under which Art 11(2) and (3) of the 1980 Convention will also cease to apply. 
59 See the Explanatory Report, at para 117.  These ‘problems’, however, are not articulated in the Report, but includes the 
issue of whether the place of contact is regarded as “an essential element” of the order. 
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international instruments of internal law and by implementing, where appropriate, 
such safeguards and guarantees as may be provided in the contact order. 
 
2. A decision on the return of the child shall be made, whenever possible, within six 
weeks of the date of an application for the return’. 
 
As the Explanatory Report says,60 although the  Convention does not itself deal with recognition 
and enforcement of contact orders, Article 16 is an important additional guarantee for the proper 
exercise of transfrontier contact.    
 
Article 11 obliges each State Party to establish a Central Authority to discharge the functions 
provided for by the Convention in cases of transfrontier contact.  Mirroring the 1980 European 
Custody Convention, Article 12 enjoins Central Authorities to ‘co-operate with each other and 
promote co-operation between the competent authorities, including judicial authorities’ and to act 
with all ‘necessary dispatch’.  Underlining the importance of international co-operation, Article 13 
enjoins judicial authorities and ‘social and other bodies’ to co-operate in relation to proceedings 
regarding transfrontier contact.  Central authorities are particularly required to assist judicial 
authorities in communicating with each other and obtaining such information and assistance as 
may be necessary for them to achieve the Convention’s objectives; and assist children, parents and 
others having family ties with the child to institute proceedings regarding transfrontier contact. 
 
(ii) Commentary 
 
The Contact Convention has a positive contribution to make towards tackling the thorny problem 
of access or contact.  It is helpful to have agreed general principles upon which orders are made in 
the first place and it is advantageous to have a Convention which reflects modern thinking about 
the issue, not least by referring to ‘contact’ rather than ‘access’ and defining it appropriately. 
 
So far as transfrontier contact is concerned there are some potentially important provisions.  Of 
these perhaps the most interesting is that of advance recognition which seems a good idea.  The 
provision for the return of the child at the end of the contact period could also be a useful 
supplement to the other instruments particularly the enjoinder to reach a decision within six 
weeks.  The powers to modify an access order under Article 15 might well be an improvement on 
the existing Article 11 of the 1980 European Custody Convention, though in view of the revised 
Brussels II Regulation, the opportunity to apply it is severely limited. The provisions concerning 
co-operation are generally well thought out though perhaps the opportunity was missed to 
promote and facilitate amicable settlements. 
 
Although the Contact Convention satisfies the twin tests of modernity and utility, its major 
difficulty is its inter-relationship with other international instruments dealing with access.  
Nevertheless the Convention manages to tread a fine line between not stepping on the toes of 
other Conventions on questions of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, while (assuming that 
it is possible to mix and match Conventions) making some positive contribution to dealing with 
the problem.  Concerted efforts should be made to encourage further ratifications and accessions. 
 
 
 
                                                     
60 At para 118. 
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(f) Other instruments 
 
Time and space does not permit a detailed analysis of all the Council’s Recommendations in the 
field of family law.  Some, like Resolution (72) 29 on the lowering of the age of full legal capacity 
and possibly Resolution 78 (37) on Equality of Spouses in Law, have probably fulfilled their 
purpose but do not require further action.  Others, such as Resolution (77) 12 on the nationality of 
spouses of different nationalities and Resolution 77 (13) on the nationality of children born in 
wedlock have to some extent been overtaken by the 1997 European Convention on Nationality.  
This raises the issue, previously adverted to, as to whether Recommendations can be withdrawn.  
But a number of others remain of some importance.  For example, Recommendation No R (98) 1 on 
Family Mediation and Recommendation No R (98) 8 on Children’s Participation in Family and 
Social Life remain of considerable contemporary importance and relevance.  They compliment the 
1996 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights and their application could 
profitably be reviewed together with that Convention (although note should be taken of the EU’s 
proposals and the possible interest of the Hague Conference concerning mediation).  Another pair 
of Recommendations, namely, Recommendation No R (79) 37 Concerning the Protection of 
Children Against Ill-treatment and Recommendation No R (85) on Violence in the Family are also 
of considerable contemporary importance and concern and could profitably be revisited to 
determine the level of compliance and whether they could or should be converted into a 
Convention. 
 
Another group of Recommendations that are worth reviewing are those dealing with public law 
issues concerning children, namely, Recommendation No R (87) 6 on foster families, 
Recommendation No R (91) 9 on emergency measures in family law and (possibly) 
Recommendation No R (87) 20 on social reactions to juvenile delinquency.  Issues of public law fall 
outside the field of competence of the European Union and not being primarily issues of private 
international law, will not be dealt with by the Hague Conference.  At the same time the issues are 
of contemporary relevance and have been the subject of a number of European Court of Human 
Rights decisions (discussed further below).61  It may be, therefore, that this is another area which 
the Council could consider for future action. 
 
IV How Instruments Should Be Monitored62 
 
It is, of course, one thing to draw up an international instrument but quite another to determine 
the extent to which it is complied with.  Because of the obvious need to know whether and how a 
particular instrument is working, monitoring the application of instruments is an extremely 
important issue.  This has been recognised by the Council and indeed at its October 2005 meeting, 
the Bureau of the CDCJ instructed the Secretariat to prepare concrete proposals on monitoring, 
with the CJ-FA being in charge of this initial activity in the field of family law.  Further, in the light 
of this instruction, the CJ-FA has been invited to establish a monitoring mechanism.63  As a result of 
this instruction/invitation, the issue of monitoring is a crucial part of the remit of this review. 
 
                                                     
61 See e.g. KA v Finland [2003] 1 FLR 696, Venema v Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 552, P, C and S v United Kingdom [2002] 2 FLR 
631 TP and KM v United Kingdom (Application Number 28945/95) [2001] 2 FLR 549, K and T v Finland [2001] 2 FLR 707 and 
Scott v United Kingdom [2000] 1 FLR 958. 
62 I would like to acknowledge the help of Maaike Voorhoeve (a Doctoral Student at the University of Amsterdam) for 
the preparation of this section. 
63 See the Bureau of the European Committee on Legal Co-Operation “monitoring the implementation of instruments 
falling within the field of competence of the CDCJ”.  CDCJ-BU (2006) 2. 
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To tackle this issue consideration will first be given to reviewing the existing mechanisms for 
monitoring in the various family law instruments drawn up by the Council.  Regard will also be 
had to monitoring mechanisms used in other family law instruments drawn up by the Hague 
Conference and the European Union.  In the light of this review suggestions will be made on how 
to proceed. 
 
One further preliminary point needs to be made, namely, as to what is meant by a “monitoring” 
provision.  There are, of course, direct reviewing mechanisms such as a formally stated obligation 
to review the instrument, the imposition of an obligation upon Contracting States to explain the 
way in which the instrument is complied with, or the creation of a Standing Committee to oversee 
the operation of the instrument.  But in addition there are what may be termed as “soft monitoring 
devices” such as States having to notify the General Assembly of the measures taken to implement 
a particular instrument or to communicate contact details of the authority(ies) required to be set up 
to the Secretary-General (such appointments are in themselves an indication that the State is 
implementing the standards of the instrument in question).  Examples of all these methods can be 
found in the family law instruments. 
 
(a) Existing mechanisms for monitoring the Council’s family law instruments 
 
(i) General monitoring mechanisms 
 
Before examining monitoring mechanisms specifically provided for in individual instruments it is 
worth pointing out that there are some more general means of reviewing Council standards.  A 
key body, of course, is the European Court of Human Rights, which will adjudicate alleged 
breaches of the European Convention, in particular, in the family law context, Article 8 (right to 
respect for family life) and Article 12 (right to marry).  Many of the Council’s instruments in the 
field of family law build on these individual rights set out in the Human Rights Convention.  
However, since complaints are lodged against a particular State, rulings are necessarily State 
specific and while Court judgments may have wide implications for other States, recourse to the 
Strasbourg court cannot be regarded as a satisfactory general mechanism of review. 
 
It is also worth mentioning in this context, the Commissioner of Human Rights, whose role with 
regard to monitoring the implementation of Council of Europe standards, is complementary to 
that of the Court. The Commissioner has several functions, among which is: “providing advice and 
assistance: (i) to member States:”, when he/she identifies possible shortcomings in the law and 
practice of member states, and to promote “the effective implementation of [human rights] 
standards by member States and assists them, with their agreement, in their efforts to remedy such 
shortcomings” (Article 3e). The Commissioner exercises his or her functions independently and 
impartially while respecting the competence of the supervisory bodies set up under the human 
rights instruments of the Council of Europe. However, the Commissioner does not take up 
individual complaints and cannot, therefore, accept any requests to present individual complaints 
before national or international courts, nor before national administrations...” Furthermore, like 
the Court, the Commissioner is only competent regarding the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  In short, unless the mandate is changed, the Commissioner cannot be regarded as a 
general monitoring agent.   
 
In contrast to the Court and the Commissioner, the Committee of Ministers does play an important 
role in the general monitoring of the implementation of instruments. According to Article 15 of the 
Statute of the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers is competent to monitor the 
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implementation of recommendations: ‘In appropriate cases, the conclusions of the Committee may 
take the form of recommendations to the governments of members, and the Committee may 
request the governments of members to inform it of the action taken by them with regard to such 
recommendations.’64 
 
The Parliamentary Assembly has appointed a Monitoring Committee which is responsible for 
verifying the fulfilment of obligations assumed by member states under the terms of the 
Organisation's Statute, the Convention on Human Rights and all other Council of Europe 
Conventions, as well as the honouring of commitments entered into by the authorities of member 
states upon accession to the Council of Europe. 
 
Under Article 52 of the Convention, the Secretary-General has the right to request from any State 
Party an explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation 
of the provisions of the Convention. In ratifying the Convention, the States Parties accept the 
obligation to supply the requested explanations. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Committee of Ministers has mandated the CDCJ to 
monitor the instruments in its field of competence. According to Article 4. B. iii. of the Terms of 
Reference of the CDCJ, one of its functions is to: “... monitor the functioning and implementation 
of the international instruments coming within its field of competence ...”. Furthermore, according 
to Article 4. D “The CDCJ shall assist States: i. to carry out appropriate reforms: a. with regard to 
their domestic laws: b. to implement international instruments…” The CDCJ shall also, according 
to Article 4. D ii: “… obtain information by means of: a. publications …; b. conferences …”. 
 
The legal basis for the competence of the Committee to monitor Conventions is based on 
international treaty practice. Because there is a need for follow-up of instruments, the body 
adopting a convention has the function of monitoring its implementation by the Contracting 
Parties. 
 
(ii) Specific monitoring mechanisms provided for in the family law instruments 
 
Most of the instruments, including Conventions, under review have no direct monitoring 
mechanisms.  A number, however, impose obligations upon States to notify the Secretary-General 
of the measures taken to comply with the requirements imposed by the instrument.65  This is true 
of the 1967 Convention on the Adoption of Children (Articles 1 and 2) and its proposed 
replacement (Article 1 of the draft Convention)66 and the 1975 Convention on the Legal Status of 
Children Born Out of Wedlock (Article 1). A similar obligation is included in some of the older 
Resolutions (see, for example, Res (72) 1 on the standardisation of the legal concepts of “domicile” 
and “residence”; Res (72) 29 on the lowering of the age of full legal capacity and Res (78) 37 on the 
                                                     
64 Furthermore by rule 9, part 2 of the rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of 
judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 May 2006 at the 964th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), the Committee of Ministers monitors the implementation of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  In this connection ‘The Committee of Ministers shall be entitled to consider any 
communication from non-governmental organisations, as well as national institutions for the promotion and protection 
of human rights, with regard to the execution of judgments under Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention.’ 
 
65 On a strict interpretation of this type of provision, no obligation of notification arises if, prior to ratification, a State’s 
laws already comply with the instrument in question, see further below. 
66 The draft Convention also requires State Parties to notify the Secretary-General of the names and addresses of the 
competent authority to which enquiries can be made pursuant to Article 14 (Article 28). 
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equality of spouses in civil law).  Recommendation No R (79) 37 Concerning the Protection of 
Children Against Ill-Treatment goes a further inviting “governments of member states to inform 
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe every five years of the steps they have taken to 
implement the present recommendation.  Another variation is Article 2 of the 1967 Adoption 
Convention which obliges Contracting Parties to notify the Secretary-General both of measures 
taken to comply with Part III (which provides “supplementary provision” to the Convention) and 
“having given effect, it ceases to give effect to any of these provisions” (emphasis added). 
 
In none of the above instruments is it provided what the Secretary-General should do with the 
notifications – there is, for example, no obligation to publish them.  Nor is there any sanction for 
failure to notify the Secretary-General. 
 
The 2003 Convention on Contact Concerning Children has no direct monitoring mechanism but 
there is an obligation (Article 11) to notify the Secretary-General of any appointment of a Central 
Authority.  There is also provision (Article 21) for a Party to propose amendments.  Such proposals 
must be communicated to the CDCJ and that body must express its opinion on the proposal to the 
Committee of Ministers.  This process could operate as one of review. 
 
None of the post 1970s Recommendations, including in particular those on parental 
responsibilities, violence in the family and family mediation, have any direct or “soft” monitoring 
provisions at all. 
 
Of all the family law instruments only two have what may be fairly described as direct monitoring 
mechanisms.  The first of these is the 1980 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decisions Concerning Custody, Article 28 of which directs the Secretary-General to invite 
representatives of the Central Authorities67 appointed by the Contracting State “to meet in order to 
study and to facilitate the functioning of the Convention”. 
 
According to Article 28 the first meeting had to be called at the end of the third year following the 
Convention’s entry into force and thereafter at the Secretary-General’s discretion.68 
 
More extensive provision for monitoring is made in the 1996 Convention on the Exercise of 
Children’s Rights inasmuch as Article 16 provides for the creation of a Standing Committee whose 
express function is to “keep under review” problems relating to the Convention.  It is empowered 
to consider any questions concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Convention 
and can make recommendations thereon (subject to there being a three quarters majority).  It can 
also propose amendments to the Convention and provide advice and assistance to national bodies 
set up to promote the exercise of children’s rights.  Mirroring the obligation under the 1980 
Convention, Article 20 directs the Secretary-General to invite the Standing Committee to meet at 
the end of the third year following the Convention’s entry into force and thereafter at the 
Secretary-General’s discretion.  In fact because of “budgetary restraints and staff limitations” the 
first meeting was not held until June 2006 nearly six years after the Convention first came into 
force.69 
 
 
                                                     
67 Article 2(3) obliges Contracting States to notify the Secretary-General of the appointment of a central authority. 
68 There have been 10 such meetings in all.  The last one was held in June 2006. 
69 Standing Committee on the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights T-ED 3 (2006) E. 
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(iii) Monitoring provisions and practice in comparable Hague and EU instruments 
 
How do the monitoring provisions in the Council instruments compare with those in family law 
instruments drawn up by the Hague Conference and the European Union?  
 
Surprisingly, there are no monitoring provisions in the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention but in 
practice the Permanent Bureau organises periodic Special Commissions, held roughly every four 
years, to review the operation of the Convention.  To date there have been five such meetings.  
This practice has been expressly incorporated into both the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption 
Convention (see Article 42) and the 1996 Hague Protection of Children Convention (see Article 56) 
which instructs the Secretary-General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to 
invoke at “regular intervals” a Special Commission “in order to review the practical operation of 
the Convention”. 
 
A not dissimilar technique is employed in the revised Brussels II Regulation, Article 65 of which, 
makes specific provision for a review (in the form of a presentation of report presented by the 
Commission inter alia to the European Parliament and to the Council based on information 
supplied by member states) to be conducted “no later than 1 January 2012, and every five years 
thereafter”. 
 
(b) Commentary and recommendations 
 
What this review clearly demonstrates is that the Council’s family law instruments differ widely in 
their provisions, if any, on monitoring.  In other words there is no discernible policy on review and 
monitoring in the instruments themselves.  Given the obvious importance of knowing how the 
instruments are operating, it is suggested that all future instruments concluded by the Council, be 
they Recommendations or (especially) Conventions, should make express provision for monitoring 
(indeed this issue should be considered as a matter of routine by any Working Party or Committee 
responsible for the drafting of an instrument).  It is tempting to suggest that there should be a 
single standard monitoring device but this may not be appropriate given the variety of 
instruments produced by the Council.  However, for Conventions there must be a case for making 
provision for regular review.  This could be done via the creation of a Standing Committee as in 
the Council’s 1996 Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights or simply mandating the 
Secretary-General of the Council to hold a meeting with appropriate representatives, as in the 
Council’s 1980 Custody Convention and in the Hague Conventions.  These “meetings” could take 
different forms, for example, intergovernmental meetings such as that of the CDCJ, or more 
general conferences.  The advantage of the latter is that it is more “open” but against that has to be 
balanced the question of costs. 
 
As to the frequency of meetings it seems sensible to hold one relatively soon after the coming into 
force of the Convention and the Council’s choice of requiring a meeting at the end of the third year 
in both the 1980 and 1996 Convention is certainly defendable.  However, as the experience of the 
1996 Convention shows, resources might not always permit strict compliance with this type of 
obligation. It seems preferable, therefore, to use the “Hague formula”, i.e. simply to direct the 
Secretary-General to hold meetings “at regular intervals”.  This formula also of course deals with 
subsequent meetings – it seems preferable to the Brussels II specific requirement to hold 
subsequent meetings every five years since that is too rigid and is also, it is submitted, better than 
simply leaving it to the Secretary-General’s discretion. One result of this suggestion is that the draft 
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Adoption Convention will need amending to provide for a review and any future instrument on parentage 
will also need an express monitoring mechanism. 
 
Although a formal review mechanism might not be appropriate for all Recommendations, there 
are some existing ones, for example, Recommendation No R (98) 1 on family mediation and 
Recommendation No R (99) 4 on children’s participation in family and social life where it would 
seem apt (in this regard the operation of those Recommendations could be reviewed together with 
the 1996 Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights – see further below).  For other 
Recommendations, classically those which have a narrow focus such as R (95) 6 and R (99) 4 which 
inter alia urge State to ratify the Council’s 1980 Custody and the Hague’s 1980 Abduction 
Convention or Resolution 72 (29) which recommended the lowering the age of majority to 18, it 
might be sufficient just to require States to notify the Secretary-General of measures taken.  
However, this requirement of notification should (a) clearly include the obligation to explain how 
the law already complies if no fresh steps have been taken70 and (b) obligate the Secretary-General 
to publish those responses and to conduct subsequent follow-up surveys. 
 
While the foregoing suggestions deal with future instruments there remains the question of what 
to do with existing ones.  So far as family law conventions are concerned, this is not such a large 
issue.  The 1967 Adoption Convention is in the process of being revised and work is also being 
done to modernise the 1975 Custody Convention on the Legal Studies of Children Born Out of 
Wedlock.  The 1980 Custody Convention, which in any event has a direct monitoring provision, 
has become, as has been argued, largely redundant.  The 1996 Convention on the Exercise of 
Children’s Rights has a direct monitoring provision and the Steering Committee has recently met.  
That leaves the 2003 Convention on Contact Concerning Children.    That should be reviewed at 
some point relatively soon (i.e. in late 2008 or 2009) given that it has been in operation since 1 
September, 2005  However, given the absence of any internal provision for review it is suggested 
that the Secretary-General takes it upon his own initiative to hold a review at some future point 
(either on its own or together with other instruments). 
 
As for Recommendations it would be useful to know (a) what level of compliance there is among 
member states and (b) what Recommendations member states consider to be of continuing 
importance.  It is suggested that a questionnaire be drawn up along these lines and the responses 
published and circulated for discussion at least by the CD-CJ.  Depending upon the response it 
might be worth holding a European Conference on Family Law specially devoted to reviewing all 
the family law work done by the Council and which might also be used to determine the future 
direction. 
 
It would be wrong, when considering monitoring issues, to ignore the issue of costs and resources.  
Full-scale reviews are time consuming and expensive.  They not only demand the expenditure of 
resources of the Council but also of the member states.  Obviously such costs have to be weighed 
in the balance with other priorities (though they can be reduced if meetings are organised to 
review more than one instrument).71  Nevertheless since there seems little point in drafting 
Instruments that are ineffective, it does seem vitally important to know how they are operating.  
This seems a timely moment to take stock. 
 
                                                     
70 See also below, for a discussion of monitoring before ratification. 
71 The Permanent Bureau at the Hague, for example, included reviewing the 1996 Protection of Children Convention 
together with the 1980 Abduction Convention. 
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One final issue associated with monitoring might be mentioned here, namely “monitoring” before 
ratification.  
 
The issue of monitoring deals with the implementation after ratification. However, the situation 
before ratification can also play an important role. The more the national law is made in 
compliance with the instrument before ratification, the less depends on monitoring when making 
national law answer to the standards of the Council of Europe. Guidance for individual States can 
be organised within the framework of the Council of Europe assistance and co-operation 
programmes. 
 
Even though it is assumed to be a general obligation for States to make national law in compliance 
with an instrument before ratification72, this is rarely explicitly asked for73 and is therefore not 
always the case. The Treaty Office does not check this. Many instruments provide for the 
possibility to use reservations, in order to make national law gradually in compliance with the 
instrument. Some instruments require a periodical revision of the reservation. This could be used 
as an opportunity for monitoring: requiring a motivation of the reservation at accession and of the 
renewal of the reservation. 
 
The United Nations makes use of ‘accession packages’, in order to facilitate a State to make its 
national law in compliance with the instruments. The Council could provide for such a tool, 
accompanied by a small conference or at least the appointment of an expert that can help. Another 
option would be that the Treaty Office gets more competence in this field, e.g. examining if 
national law is in compliance with the instrument. 
 
V An Evaluation of Relevant Case-Law of the European Court of Human  Rights74 
 
Even since 2000 there has been a plethora of European Court of Human Rights decisions in the 
field of family law and the following survey is of necessity selective. 
 
Reference has already been made to some case-law both in connection with paternity issues and 
with public law issues concerning children.  Here the case-law is discussed in a little more detail. 
 
(a) Paternity issues 
 
A number of recent decisions have been concerned with restrictions or even prohibitions on 
bringing proceedings to establish or to deny paternity.  In Rozanski v Poland75 it was held that the 
inability of the applicant (who was not married to the mother) to commence either of the 
procedures (viz appointing a guardian, or requesting the district prosecutor to do so) open to him 
                                                     
72 Art. 18 Vienna Convention:  
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty 
when: 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty 
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 
73 Council of Europe: only in connection with the Convention on Data Protection. 
74 I wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Katarina Horosova, Research Assistant at Cardiff University Law 
School’s Centre for International Family Law Studies. 
75 Application No 55339/00, [2006] 2 FCR 178. 
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to establish his paternity violated his Article 8 rights.  Conversely, in both Shofman v Russia76 and 
Mizzi v Malta77 the inability of the husbands in each case to challenge the presumption of paternity 
notwithstanding the evidence of DNA tests violated, inter alia, their Article 8 rights.  Restrictions 
have to be proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued, i.e. some restrictions (for example, 
time limits) might be justifiable but they must not be arbitrary or discriminatory, or pointless.  An 
illustration of this latter point is Znamenskaya v Russia78 in which a mother wished to challenge the 
registration of her former husband as the father of her stillborn child but was thwarted because the 
domestic courts held that the relevant legislation only applied to living children and in any event 
the dead child had acquired no civil rights.  Here it was held that the prevailing of a legal 
presumption over biological and social reality without regard to both established facts and the 
wishes of those concerned and which benefited no-one was a clear violation of Article 8.  Finally, 
regard might also be had to Mikulic v Croatia79 in which a domestic court’s inefficiency to determine 
paternity violated the child’s (who had been born out of wedlock) Article 8 rights to have the 
uncertainty as to her personal identity resolved without unnecessary delay. 
 
This case-law has relevance to the current work being done on parentage.80 
 
(b) Public law issues concerning children 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the seriousness of the issue, there have been numerous cases 
concerning the State’s removal or failure to remove children into care.  They have also concerned a 
number of different Convention rights. 
 
A cluster of decisions, all against the United Kingdom, have concerned alleged breaches of Article 
3 (in these cases, the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading punishment).  Thus in E v 
United Kingdom81 the local authority’s failure to protect children from abuse by their stepfather 
(who had been convicted of offences of indecency and who, as the local authority knew, still lived 
at home contrary to a probation order condition) violated Article 3.  Similarly, in Z v United 
Kingdom82 Article 3 was also found to be violated because of the local authority’s failure to take 
adequate protective measures in respect of the severe neglect and abuse which the four applicant 
children were known to be suffering at the hands of their parents. 
 
Article 5 (the right to liberty etc) was unsuccessfully invoked in Koniarska v United Kingdom83 by an 
applicant detained under a secure accommodation order since its purpose was educational 
supervision as interpreted for Convention purposes. 
 
                                                     
76 Application No 74826/01, [2006] 1 FLR 680. 
77 Application No 26111/01, [2006] 1 FLR 1048.  See also Paulik v Slovakia (Application No 10699/05), [2006] 3 FCR 323 and 
Tavli v Turkey (Application No 11449/00). 
78 Application No 77785/01, [2005] 2 FCR 406. 
79 [2002] 1 FCR 720.  Note also Karcheva v Bulgaria (Application No 60939/00), [2006] 3 FCR 434 in which unduly long 
proceedings to resolve paternity was held to be in breach of Article 6. 
80 As does Odiévre v France [2003] 1 FCR 621 in which the inability of a child seeking information about her birth mother 
who had given birth anonymously was held (surprisingly) not to violate her Article 8 rights. 
81 [2003] 1 FLR 348.  Cf DP and JC v United Kingdom [2003] 1 FLR 50 in which because the local authority did not know 
about the case there had been no violation of Article 3 (nor Article 8) though on the facts the lack of an effective remedy 
violated Article 13. 
82 Application No 29392/95, [2001] 2 FLR 612. 
83 Application No 33670/96 (12 October, 2000). 
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Most cases, however, invoke allegations of violations of Article 8 (right to respect for family life) 
and/or Article 6 (right to a fair trial).  They involve a variety of issues.  For example, some involve 
the question of removal of children at birth.  Thus in K and T v Finland,84 Article 8 was found to be 
violated on the basis that while compelling reasons were needed to justify a removal at birth 
against the mother’s will, no such reasons were found in this case.  A similar decision was reached 
in P, C and S v United Kingdom85 it being held that (notwithstanding that the mother had previously 
lost custody of an older child and had been found guilty of deliberately causing injury to the child) 
the removal of her second child at birth violated Article 8 because such a removal was unnecessary 
as there was no suspicion of life threatening conduct from the mother immediately after the child’s 
birth. 
 
Other cases emphasise the temporary nature of care and the consequent positive duty to take 
measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as is reasonably feasible.  See in this respect R v 
Finland86 and KA v Finland.87  Another aspect of initial removal and subsequent retention of a child 
is the need for procedural fairness.  Hence, the lack of an ability to participate in decision making 
can amount to a breach of Article 6.  See in this respect Venema v Netherlands,88 P, C and S v United 
Kingdom89 and L v Finland.90  Note might also be taken of TP and KM v United Kingdom,91 in which 
the local authority’s failure to disclose vital evidence (a video of the child’s disclosure interview) 
which deprived the mother an effective opportunity to deal with allegations that the child could 
not be safely returned to her, was held to violate Article 8. 
 
Cases raising other issues include MG v United Kingdom,92 in which the failure to provide the 
applicant (who had spent periods in voluntary care) with a full copy of his social services records 
violated Article 8 and L v United Kingdom93 where it was held not to be in breach of Article 8 to 
disclose to the police an expert’s report prepared for care proceedings and available to all parties to 
those proceedings. 
 
It is submitted that, as this brief résumé shows, there is sufficient material, particularly in view of 
the existing Recommendations on emergency measure (R (91) 9), social reactions to juvenile 
delinquency (R (87) 20) and on foster families (R (87) 6) to justify identifying public law issues 
concerning children as being a potential area for further work by the Council. 
 
(c) Private law disputes concerning children94 
 
Not surprisingly a number of petitions determined by the Court involve private law disputes 
particularly concerning access disputes.  One repeated type of breach of Article 8 is a State’s failure 
                                                     
84 [2001] 2 FLR 707.  Note also the breach of Article 8 by reason of the failure to take proper steps to reunite the family. 
85 [2002] 2 FLR 631.  Compare also Haase v Germany (Application No 11057/2) [2004] 2 FLR 39 in which a court decision 
(made in the parents’ absence) to remove parental rights and to deny access, was, given the absence of urgency, held to 
be unjustifiable interference with family life, contrary to Article 8. 
86 Application No 34141/96, [2006] 2 FCR 264. 
87 [2003] 1 FLR 696. 
88 [2003] 1 FLR 552.  See also Moser and another v Austria (Application No 12643/02), [2006] 3 FCR. 
89 Above.  But compare Gnahore v France (2002) 34 EHRR 38 and Scott v United Kingdom [2000] 1 FLR 958. 
90 [2000] 2 FLR 118. 
91 Application No 28945/95, [2001] 2 FLR 549. 
92 [2002] 3 FCR 289. 
93 [2000] 2 FLR 332. 
94 The following discussion omits references to cases whose deportation etc is alleged to violate Article 8 on the basis of 
interfering with family life. 
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either to enforce or speedily to enforce a contact order.  See in this respect Zawadka v Poland,95 
Kosmopoulou v Greece96 and Hansen v Turkey.97  A number of other cases have concerned the lack of 
enforcement measures to effect a return following child abduction.98  However, although these are 
important rulings, their overall significance for this review is perhaps limited.  Perhaps of more 
relevance are cases which involve the issue of hearing the child’s voice, which is central to the aim 
of the 1996 Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights.  In this respect note might be taken of 
C v Finland99 in which it was held too much reliance had been placed on the children’s views, 
effectively giving them a right of veto.  Another important decision is Sahin v Germany, Sommerfeld 
v Germany100 in which it was held, contrary to the earlier Chamber decision, to be going too far to 
say that domestic courts should always hear evidence from a child in court.  In Sahin the child was 
five and the domestic court was held to be entitled to rely on the findings of an expert.  However, 
in contrast the failure to commission any independent report is likely to be contrary to Article 8.101 
 
(d) Miscellaneous cases 
 
Not all Human Rights cases directly involve children or involve them at all.  For example two 
cases102 against Germany involved changes in legislation resulting in non payment of child benefit 
to the applicants.  This was held on the facts to be in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 8.  Other recent cases have involved  successful claims in relation to statelessness,103 the 
inability to get married,104 and the refusal to allow a married woman to use only her maiden 
name.105 
 
However, while these decisions are important in themselves they have little significance in 
planning at this stage, future work in the field of family law. 
 
VI What Direction The Council’s Future Family Law Programme Might Take 
 
The obvious immediate priority for the Council is to complete its current work in the field of 
family law.  In the first place this means finalising the draft Convention on the Adoption of 
Children.  Such an instrument should take account both of the comments made in this Review and, 
of course, any other comments that may have been received.  It should also include express 
monitoring provisions and an express statement that upon ratification the 1967 Convention ceases 
to have effect.  The Explanatory Notes could profitably explain how the new instrument’s Articles 
replace those of the 1967 Convention.  In this regard it would be helpful to include a Derivation 
Table. 
                                                     
95 Application No 48542/99, [2006] 1 FLR 371. But compare e.g. Süss v Germany (Application No 40324/98), [2006] 1 FLR 
522 in which no violation was found because the applicant himself had contributed to the delays; and Glaser v United 
Kingdom [2001] 1 FLR 253 – complexity of proceedings justified delay. 
96 Application No 60457/00, [2004] 1 FLR 800. 
97 Application No 36141/97, [2004] 1 FLR 142. See also Lebbnik v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR 18 and Nuutinen v Finland 
(2002) 34 EHRR 15. 
98 See in this respect Karadzic v Croatia (Application No 35030/04), [2004] 1 FCR 36, Gil and AUI v Spain (Application No 
56673/00), [2005] 1 FLR 190, Maire v Portugal (Application No 48206/00), [2004] 2 FLR 653, Sylvester v Austria (Application 
Nos 36812/97 and 40104/98), [2003] 2 FLR 210 and Ignaccolo-Zenide v Romania (2001) 31 EHRR 212. 
99 Application No 18249/02, [2006] 2 FCR 195. 
100 [2003] 2 FLR 671. 
101 See e.g. Palau-Martinez v France (Application No 64927/01), [2004] 2 FLR 810 and Elshoz v Germany [2000] 2 FLR 486. 
102 See Okpisz v Germany (2006) 42 EHRR 32 and Niedzwieki v Germany (2006) 42 EHRR 33. 
103 See Sisojeva v Latvia (2006) 43 EHRR 33. 
104 B v United Kingdom (2006) 42 EHRR 11. 
105 Űnal Tekeli v Turkey (2006) 42 EHRR 53. 
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The second priority is for the Council to complete its work on parentage.  In this regard it is 
recommended that the new instrument should be a Convention (i.e. not a Recommendation).  Such 
a Convention should be based on the White Paper On Principles Concerning the Establishment 
and Legal Consequences of Parentage but taking into account (a) the comments received during 
the consultation period, (b) the comments made in this Review, (c) the recent European Court of 
Human Rights case-law and, ideally, (d) having regard to the about to be completed Principles 
Regarding Parental Responsibilities drawn up by the Commission on European Family Law.  The 
new instrument should also include express monitoring provisions and should explicitly replace 
both the 1975 Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock and 
Recommendation (84) 4 on Parental Responsibilities.  The Explanatory Notes should clearly state 
how the new provisions equate or relate to both those of the 1975 Convention and 1984 
Recommendation and include a Derivation Table. 
 
A third issue, not to be overlooked when considering priorities, is to factor in reviews.  
Consideration needs to be given as to whether a full-scale European Conference to review all the 
Council’s family law instruments should be organised. 
 
Apart from the above mentioned priorities consideration needs to be given as to what new fields 
of study might be undertaken by the Council.  Existing Recommendations point to two fields, 
namely, domestic violence and public law issues concerning children.  Both fields are of 
contemporary importance and fall within the norm-setting criteria set out in the Introduction.  It 
may be that in relation to domestic violence the Recommendations already go far enough, though 
it would be important to know how far member states comply with the Recommendations.  This at 
least argues for a review.  With regard to public law issues concerning children, Human Rights 
case-law (discussed in Section V above) does suggest that there is a need to examine this area and 
it is therefore suggested that serious consideration be given to investigating this topic. 
 
Looking further ahead there is an arguable case for examining divorce law and the legal position 
of non marital cohabitants.  Again each of these areas are of contemporary importance and fall 
within the norm-setting criteria set out in the Introduction.  The case for examining divorce is that 
with the increasing mobility of the population (encouraged by freedom of movement within the 
European Union) there is increasing pressure to harmonise this key law of status.  Advantage can 
be taken of the work done by the CEFL which, after commissioning reports on the position in 22 
European jurisdictions, has drawn up a set of Principles on Divorce.106 
 
With regard to the position of cohabitants, there is some evidence that this is becoming of 
increasing concern to many European jurisdictions and again with the increasing mobility of the 
population, there is an obvious need for some harmonisation of rights and protection. 
 
                                                     
106 See K Boele-Woelki, F Ferrand, C González Beilfuss, M Jänterä-Jareborg, N Lowe, D Martiny and W Pintens Principles 
of European Family Law Regarding Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses (2002). 
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VII Summary of Suggestions and Recommendations 
  
(a) General Issues 
 
• The Council should avoid duplicating work done by the Hague Conference of Private 
International Law and the European Union.  Clashes of international instruments should be 
avoided at all costs. 
• The Council’s existing instruments should be judged according to their modernity, utility 
and their compatibility with the instruments drawn up by other international bodies. 
• The Council’s future work should be based on norm setting driven in part by the rulings of 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
• The relationship between Recommendations and Conventions needs careful consideration.  
Query whether there should be a policy on the role of future Recommendations? 
• Efforts should be made to widen the reach of the commitment to Conventions.  Accessions 
should be encouraged. 
• Future Conventions should be “accession friendly”. 
 
(b) Existing Instruments 
 
• The draft Convention on Adoption of Children is generally to be welcomed (though some 
details of drafting need attending to and there needs to be a specific monitoring provision). 
• The 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock and 
Recommendation (84) 4 on Parental Responsibilities need to be replaced along the lines of 
the White Paper on Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of 
Parentage.  This new instrument should take the form of a Convention and be a top priority 
for the Council’s future work. 
• The 1980 European “Custody” Convention has largely become redundant and should no 
longer be promoted. 
• The 1996 European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights is worth promoting 
and efforts should be made to secure more ratifications and accessions (in this respect the 
wider observer participation on the Steering Committee is a welcome development). 
• The 2003 European Convention on Contact Concerning Children is worth promoting and 
efforts should be made to secure more ratifications (the “EU” problem being noted) and 
accessions.  The Secretary General of the Council should call a meeting to review the 
Convention in due course. 
• The Recommendations concerning family violence and the protection of children and on 
public law concerning children remain of contemporary importance and would be 
profitably revisited with a review to considering whether they could or should be 
converted into a Convention. 
• The Recommendation on Mediation and on Children’s Participation in Family and Social 
Life are of considerable contemporary importance and should be promoted. 
 
(c) Monitoring 
 
• All future instruments should include express monitoring provisions.  The “Hague 
formula” of directing the Secretary General to hold meetings “at regular internals” might 
be an appropriate approach for Conventions and “major” Recommendations. 
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• For “minor” Recommendations, notification of compliance might be sufficient provided 
there is an obligation to publish the responses and an opportunity for such responses to be 
discussed and evaluated. 
• Consideration might be given to organising a European Conference on Family Law 
specifically to review the utility of the existing instruments (particularly 
Recommendations). 
 
(d) The Council’s Future Family Law Programme 
 
• Clear priority should be given to completing the current work on adoption and parentage. 
• Any new instrument on parentage should be a Convention which should replace the 1975 
Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock and Recommendation 
(84) 4 on Parental Responsibilities. 
• Also to be factored in when assessing priorities is the need for a coherent strategy of 
review.  Query whether a European Conference should be held to review the family law 
instruments? 
• Further fields of study could be Domestic Violence and Public Law Issues Concerning 
Children.  Because of Human Rights case-law it is suggested that the latter field be given 
priority. 
• Looking further ahead a possible field of study could be (a) Divorce – taking advantage of 
the CEFL’s work and (b) The legal position of cohabitants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
